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As the independence of national central banks in the European Union is one of the 
main institutional features of the monetary constitution of the EU, the paper tries to 
find out whether central banks are factually independent in their decisions about 
interest rates if they face political pressure. The Havrilesky (1993) methodology of 
the political pressure on central banks is applied to the Czech National Bank, a 
central bank of one of the new EU Member States, in order to test whether the 
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From the institutional perspective, one of the main building blocks of the European 
System of Central Banks is the independence of the national central banks. Both theoretical 
discussion and empirical evidence showed that monetary constitution where the central bank’s 
decision body is isolated from government when deciding about monetary policy is an 
effective arrangement for maintaining macroeconomic stability, one of the necessary 
conditions for a sustainable economic development. As a result, central banks, and not only in 
the European Union, are nowadays granted a large degree of independence from the political 
system, at least from the short-term preferences of the incumbent government.
1
Nevertheless, although formally independent from politics, central banks will always 
remain in center of politicians’ attention. The reason is that central banks, when aiming at 
maintenance of price stability, influence via monetary policy instruments the entire 
macroeconomic development, including the GDP and wage growth, which in turn may have 
an impact on success of different political groups in the political competition. Thus, if there is 
a possibility for politicians to influence current monetary policy in favor of their interests, i.e. 
maximization of political support and re-election chances, they will definitely use it. 
Moreover, no central bank can be fully independent from the political system, as 
central bank – as a public institution serving for maintaining price stability, a collective good 
– is a part of the political system in a wider sense. Members of the central bank’s decision 
body are usually selected via political mechanisms, appointed by one or more political, i.e. 
collective bodies such as parliament, government or the president. The central bank 
legislation, which determines the legal environment in which central bank operates, is a part 
of the legal system that is formed and amended by the legislative, i.e. also by political bodies.  
It is clear that the two political factors – i.e. short-term re-election interests of 
government on one hand, and long-term interests of all members of the society regarding rules 
of the game of monetary policy rather than the actual conduct of it on the other hand - should 
                                                           
1 For the issues related to independence of central banks and the effect on macroeconomic 
stability see Cukierman (1992), Moser (2000) or Berger et al. (2001). 
1 be ideally separated. Nevertheless, in practice this is difficult to accomplish. As a result, there 
are often ways and channels through which politicians are able to influence monetary policy 
of formally independent central banks.  
This paper follows the public choice approach to monetary policy and applies a 
methodology originally developed by Havrilesky (1993) for measuring political pressure on 
central banks and testing whether such pressure influences monetary policy. The methodology 
is applied to the Czech National Bank, next to the original Federal Reserve and the Deutsche 
Bundesbank (Maier 2002) the third central bank to which this methodology has been applied. 
We aim at answering the question whether there has been political pressure exercised on the 
Czech National Bank, and whether the bank has fallen prey to it, accommodating the revealed 
preferences of those executing the pressure. Using the same methodology as Havrilesky 
(1993) and Maier (2002) also allows some basic comparisons of all three central banks in 
terms of the amount of political pressure they face and their responsiveness to it.  
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 shortly surveys the literature on the 
linkages between politics and monetary policy. Section 3 introduces and discusses the 
Havrilesky’s methodology for measuring the political pressure, while section 4 presents the 
results from its application to the Czech National Bank over the period 1997-2005, including 
some comparisons with the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Deutsche Bundesbank. Section 5 
attempts to explain the pattern of pressure on the Czech National Bank. Section 6 presents the 
results of several econometric tests of whether political pressure exercised on the Czech 
central bank influenced the conduct of monetary policy. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Survey of the literature 
Analyses of linkages between politics and macroeconomic policy in general have quite 
a long tradition within economics, especially in the public choice literature.2 A natural point 
of departure is the so-called political business cycle (PBC) hypothesis, first empirically 
illustrated by Kramer (1971) and Tufte (1978) and theoretically underpinned by Nordhaus 
(1975). The PBC can be summarized as follows: if economic conditions before elections 
influence voters’ choices, politicians will be aware of it and attempt to make advantage of it. 
As a result, economic cycles will be correlated with political cycles, with boosts before 
elections. Empirical evidence, as surveyed for example by Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), 
showed that voters in fact take into account the macroeconomic situation when voting. There 
is also strong empirical evidence of manipulation of economic conditions by incumbent 
politicians, although only indirect (i.e. that economic activity exhibit a political cycle, without 
discussing the channels through which politicians actually influence economic activity to their 
political advantage). As shown by Nordhaus (1975), if voters are not rational, incumbent 
government may use expansionary monetary policy as a tool and fully exhaust the trade-off 
embodied in the short-term Philips curve in order to boost employment at the cost of later 
higher inflation. Nevertheless, this model assumes that government has the monetary policy 
fully in control. Furthermore, empirical evidence clearly rejects the simple Nordhaus’ model 
as regards the inflation and employment pattern, but is unclear as regards the manipulation of 
policy instruments.3
                                                           
2 For a survey of literature see Toma (2001), Mueller (2003), chapter 19, or Drazen (2000), 
chapter 7. 
3 As Drazen (2000, p. 239) puts it, “the evidence for opportunistic manipulation of 
macroeconomic policy is stronger than for macroeconomic outcomes”.  
2 The simple PBC hypothesis described above is usually labeled as “opportunistic” 
PBC, as it disregards the importance of the party that forms government. A parallel line of 
research called “partisan” PBC (Hibbs 1977) assumes that different parties have different 
preferences over the employment versus inflation (for example because different parties may 
have different electorates with different sensitivities to inflation and employment), so that the 
pattern of economic cycle depends on which party forms the government. Empirical evidence 
fairly supports the partisan PBC, with usually higher economic activity during left-wing 
governments than during right-wing governments (at least in the U.S., see Drazen 2000).4  
Political business cycle literature predicts that governments will try to use available 
macroeconomic policy instruments and influence economic activity in order to gain political 
support, especially before elections. In this respect, control over monetary policy may play a 
crucial role, and some authors show that governments may indeed have strong influence on 
actual conduct of monetary policy despite the formal independence of central banks. 
Havrilesky (1993) shows that decision on the U.S. monetary policy are strongly influenced by 
the executive branch, while Grier (1991) argues that there is a strong congressional influence 
on U.S. monetary policy illustrated by the fact that the leadership of the Senate Banking 
Committee is significantly correlated with monetary base growth. On the other hand, Wooley 
(1984) finds no systematic control of Congress over U.S. monetary policy, though 
occasionally Federal Reserve might have accommodated partisan preferences over inflation 
and unemployment by avoiding dramatic political actions during election periods. Studies 
collected in Mayer (1990) emphasize the influence of wide range of interest groups on U.S. 
monetary policy, including the financial sector, Fed-watchers, administration and congress. 
Posen (1993) focuses on the impact of financial sector on central banks’ policies, while Toma 
and Toma (1986) present several studies that treat central banks from the perspective of the 
theory of bureaucracy, emphasizing the impact of reward structure of central bankers on the 
conduct of monetary policy.  
Overall, most of the studies found that even independent central banks are in general 
responsive to political pressures, but the degree of responsiveness vary with the extent to 
which central banks are actually independent. The literature in this area discusses whether 
central banks are independent de iure only, or also de facto. Thus, the precise way of political 
control over central banks, including appointment procedures, the term of office etc., is the 
decisive factor in explaining the impact of politics on monetary policy. For example, 
Lohmann (1992) and Moser (2000) show theoretically, why an independent central bank 
accommodates politicians’ preferences when facing the treat of being overridden.  
 
3. The Havrilesky’s methodology and Maier’s extension 
If the central bank were dependent, government could easily adjust monetary policy 
according to its preferences simply by implementing it by order. However, with independent 
central banks, politicians can only try to force the central bank to adopt their preferred 
policies by indirect means, i.e. by signaling the preferred monetary policy stance and 
threatening to use all possible levers to coerce the central bank into accommodating their 
wishes.  
In order to be able to analyze systematically whether politicians and other interest 
groups exercised pressure on the central bank, and if so, how intensive the pressure was and 
whether the central bank succumbed to it, we need an indicator for political pressure. Such an 
indicator must have ideally the following properties: 
                                                           
4 For further surveys of PBC see Mueller (2003), p. 471. 
3 It must be able to measure the political pressure also in the period between elections. 
The basic PBC predicts that political pressure is usually exercised before elections, so that a 
proxy based on time should be sufficient. However, governments are seeking political support 
of the electorate also during the whole term of office, thus we need an indicator that can 
capture it. 
It must indicate the direction and strength of the pressure and thus the size of the 
conflict between the central bank’s desired policy and that of the politicians. 
It should allow for measuring the pressure from other interest groups as well, not only 
from the government.  
In his influential study on pressure on the Federal Reserve, Havrilesky (1993) 
developed an indicator that fulfils the above-mentioned properties. The indicator is based on 
the number of newspaper reports in which politicians express preferences over a more or less 
restrictive monetary policy. He has counted the number of articles in the Wall Street Journal 
in which members of the executive branch (i.e. Administration) demanded a change in 
monetary policy. If an article showed that a government official called for monetary ease, it 
was assigned a value of +1, while an article calling for monetary tightness was assigned a 
value of -1. The sum of all pluses and minuses constituted the so-called SAFER index, so that 
for example a positive value of the SAFER index over some period indicated a “net” pressure 
for monetary ease (because the remaining pluses and minuses canceled each other).  
When analyzing the pressure on the Deutsche Bundesbank, Maier (2002) extended the 
Havrilesky approach in two ways.5 First, he took into account also signals from other interest 
groups, namely from the financial sector, employers, trade unions, and others including 
academic researchers, international institutions and other non-specified articles demanding for 
change in monetary policy. The motivation for including other interest groups is to enable the 
disaggregating the total existing pressure with respect to the origin, and to test subsequently to 
which interest group’s pressure the central bank responded and to which not. Second, he also 
introduced a new variable called public support, as some literature emphasized the role of 
public support for the Bundesbank as one of the decisive factors historically contributing to 
the factual independent conduct of monetary policy aimed at price stability (Berger and de 
Haan 1999). In the same way as for pressure indicator, the support indicator was constructed 
via counting newspaper articles with supportive statement regardless of the actual monetary 
policy and assigning the value of +1 to them if they expressed support.6
It is clear that the Havrilesky and Maier’s approach to measurement of political 
pressure that is based on newspaper articles suffers under some drawbacks. First, it assumes 
that newspaper reports are representative of actual signaling from interest groups, but this 
does not have to be the case if there are also other channels through which politicians may 
signal their preferences over monetary policy (such as more informal ways through bilateral 
meetings, telephone calls or via other media). Second, it assumes that two articles mean twice 
as much pressure than one article, which need not be true. Third, the number of articles 
dealing with monetary policy may vary, depending also on whether there is enough news 
from other areas (in which case there will be probably less than average number of signals) 
                                                           
5 The part of the book by Maier (2002) to which we are referring is based on Maier et al. (2002). 
6 Maier (2002) also changed the sign of the value assigned to articles demanding change in 
monetary policy, so that articles demanding monetary ease were assigned the value of -1 and articles 
demanding monetary restriction +1. He also - in contrast to Havrilesky (2003) – counted articles from 
three different German newspapers instead of only one in order to capture the pressure as broadly as 
possible.  
4 and whether someone deliberately started a discussion about monetary policy (in which case 
there will be more than the average number of signals). Nevertheless, despite all the possible 
drawbacks, the pressure indicator based on newspaper signals may still have some value 
added in capturing the political pressure, given the lack of other indicators. 
 
4. Constructing the Pressure Indicator for the Czech National Bank  
In what follows, we construct the pressure indicator for the Czech National Bank 
(CNB), the central bank of the Czech Republic, using the Maier’s extended approach based 
on Havrilesky (1993). In the first step the newspaper was selected: Maier (2002) lists three 
criteria for a suitable newspaper from which to count “pressure” articles, namely 
independence (newspaper should be politically neutral in order to avoid political bias 
in published articles), 
availability (the newspaper should cover reasonably long time), and 
circulation (the newspaper should be widely read, especially by central bank officials, 
so that signals published there in fact reach the intended recipients). 
It is not easy no select a newspaper that fulfils all three criteria (so that for example for 
Germany, Maier (2002) decided to use articles from three different German newspapers). 
Nevertheless, as the Czech Republic is a relatively small country, the only newspaper that 
systematically follows economic developments, is regularly and widely read by economists 
(including the central bank ones), is neutral and available since the beginning of the Czech 
Republic (since 1993) is the newspaper Hospodarske noviny (“economic newspaper”). This 
Czech newspaper is additionally the best candidate to serve as a natural counterpart to 
economic newspapers like the U.S. Wall Street Journal (selected by Havrilesky) or the 
German Handelsblatt (selected – next to two others – by Maier).7  
The next step was to choose the period. The Czech Republic practiced from the 
beginning of 1993 until mid-1997 an exchange rate peg (to a basket of DEM and USD, the 
main trading partner’s currencies) and the monetary policy was based on a combination of 
maintaining exchange rate stability and monetary targeting, using monetary policy 
instruments such as forex window and interventions, minimum reserve requirements and 
interest rates. The peg was abolished in May 1997 and the Czech koruna began to float, while 
the central bank moved inflation targeting framework as of beginning of 1998, using official 
interest rates as the main monetary policy instrument. Given the “dual” nature of the monetary 
regime between 1993 and mid-1997, the central bank was to some limited extent free to 
pursue its own monetary policy despite the peg and thus it was in principle possible to get into 
conflict with government about “right” monetary policy stance.8 However, given the radical 
change in monetary policy regime and monetary policy instruments in 1997, only the period 
after the abolition of the peg and the move to floating in May 1997 is probably suitable for a 
rigorous analysis of political pressure, thus the time span June 1997 - March 2005 was chosen 
(i.e. total of 94 months, almost eight full years).  
                                                           
7 Articles in the electronic version of the archive of Hospodarske noviny (http://hn.ihned.cz) 
were used. 
8 Actually, there were conflicts between the central bank and government, especially as central 
bank moved to restrictive stance in 1996 via increasing minimum reserve requirements, see Dědek 
(2000). 
5 In line with Maier (2002), we have counted articles either directly published by 
members of five different interest groups or where members of these interest groups were 
quoted. The following five pressure groups were identified: 
government, which includes all ministers of the current government, but also other 
members of the political parties forming the government (most of them members of 
parliament, but some of them also outside the parliament), 
financial sector, including representatives and analysts of all domestic banks and other 
financial institutions (insurance corporations, pension and investment funds etc.), 
employers, i.e. representatives (managers) of non-financial corporations, 
trade unions, and 
other, including all other articles demanding change in monetary policy by other than 
members of the four above mentioned groups (i.e. for example from the general public, 
journalists, political parties in opposition, international institutions, members of academia, 
independent researchers etc.). 
All articles that dealt with the Czech National Bank were carefully reviewed and 
assessed. Following Maier (2002), and in contrast to Havrilesky (1993), articles demanding 
monetary ease were assigned the value of -1, while articles demanding monetary tightness 
were assigned the value of +1. This was done in order to facilitate the interpretation of the 
regression results in the next section. For measuring the “net” pressure, the sum of all pluses 
and minuses for all five interest groups and for the total was constructed at a monthly 
frequency, so that a negative sum indicates interest group’s net pressure for monetary ease, 
while a positive sum the net pressure for monetary restrictiveness.  
Additionally, the ratio of the sum to total number of observations for every group and 
for total pressure was calculated. In comparison to the sum, the ratio has some advantageous 
features. First, because it relates the net pressure as measured by the sum to total number of 
pressure signals, it shows the degree of internal integrity of the group. Hereby it is shown 
whether the pressure from members of a certain interest group is going in one direction (both 
over time and across different members of the same group), or whether it is rather 
heterogeneous. Thus, for a given level of the net pressure as measured by the sum, the higher 
the ratio (in absolute terms), the higher homogeneity of the pressure group (both over time 
and over different members of the group) and the more are signals from this group going in 
one direction. Second, in comparison to the sum, it is independent of the time span over which 
the ratio is calculated. As a result, it is possible to compare the pressure as measured by the 
ratio across countries, even if the time coverage is different. 
As the Czech economy is in contrast to the German and the U.S. one a small and open 
economy, it is much more sensitive to exchange rate changes. Export-oriented companies, 
their employees and finally also the political representatives may for example feel hit by  
strong exchange rate appreciation and may demand “monetary ease” by forcing the central 
bank to step in and to try to influence the exchange rate by other instruments than interest 
rates, such as by foreign exchange interventions. Thus, we extend the Havrilesky’s and 
Maier’s approach in that we additionally take into account articles from interest groups 
demanding exchange rate interventions (such that interventions aimed at weakening the Czech 
6 koruna are comparable to an interest rate decline, i.e. monetary ease, and those articles 
counted as -1).9
Finally, it must be emphasized that the Havrilesky approach cannot capture all the 
pressure that was exercised on the Czech National Bank, as some of the pressure was of more 
general nature and was only partly mirrored in the newspapers. This relates especially to the 
period 2000-2001 as the amendment of the act on Czech National Bank was discussed in the 
parliament and number of politicians (from both government and opposition parties) tried to 
use this opportunity to limit heavily the central bank independence.10 A s  s e e n  f r o m  t h e  
published articles, the main reason behind the attempt to limit the independence was the 
disagreement with the then monetary policy of the CNB that was regarded by politicians as 
too restrictive. Thus, those articles that reasoned the call for less independence by “too 
restrictive policy” were counted as pressure signals, while the other articles discussing the 
independence issue more generally were not counted, even if they could have had some 
impact.  
4.1 The Political Pressure from Government 
In order to be able to compare all three countries for which the pressure indicator was 
constructed, we start with the discussion of the pressure from government (the only interest 
group Havrilesky (1993) took into account in his pioneering work). In any case, government 
is the most interesting pressure group, because it has an intrinsic motivation to exercise 
pressure on the central bank in order to maximize political support, as discussed above. 
Additionally, in contrast to the other interest groups, it may have both direct and indirect 
possibilities how to override central bank policy. 
Table 1: Political pressure on central banks from government
CNB FED Bundesbank
# signals 41 287 85
(out of all pressure signals) 22.8% … 16.1%
period covered 1997:6-2005:3 1952:1-1991:12 1960:1-1998:12
(number of months) 94 480 468
# signals per year 5.2 7.2 2.2
# signals for monetary ease 41 192 78
# signals for monetary restrictiveness 0 95 7
sum (net pressure; minus=ease) -41 -97 -71
ratio (sum / # signals, in %) -100% -33.8% -83.5%
Source: Author's calculations based on hn.ihned.cz; Havrilesky (1993); Maier (2002).  
Table 1 shows that there are differences among the three countries as regards the way 
government puts pressure on the central bank. First, the intensity with which government asks 
for change in monetary policy differs. The number of signals from the government was much 
higher in the American case (on average around seven signals per year) than in the German 
                                                           
9 Actually, the proportion of articles calling for monetary ease via FX interventions against 
appreciating koruna is very small; only around five articles published in the “appreciation” period 
2001-2002 by exporters called explicitly for interventions against the appreciating currency, whilst 
other articles published in this period demanded more generally “monetary ease”, without specifying 
whether it should be interest rate cuts or interventions.   
10 The amendment that was finally passed limited the independence much less than the original 
suggestions seriously discussed in the parliament, but event this amendment has been later canceled by 
the constitutional court for not being in line with the constitution and EU law. 
7 case (just around two signals per year), despite the fact that pressure signals were collected 
from three newspapers in Germany, but just from one in the U.S. The Czech government lies 
in terms of the number of pressure signals between these two countries, with on average five 
signals per year. As regards the striking difference between the U.S. and the German case, 
Maier (2002, p. 80) offers two possible explanations: first, German newspapers may simply 
report less on monetary issues, and second, German government and also the public 
appreciates the Bundesbank’s policies, so that there is less conflict between the government 
and the Bundesbank. For the Czech case, the relatively high frequency of signaling from 
government indicates quite a high degree of conflict between government and the CNB, 
which may be explained by the economic development over the analyzed time and the 
government’s belief that CNB was responsible for possible adverse developments and that it 
should use its instruments to reverse it. 
Second, as the number of signals for monetary ease and contraction shows, 
government of all three countries were on average asking for monetary ease (the net pressure 
is negative in all three cases). However, the Czech government has been exclusively 
demanding monetary ease, the German government has been asking prevailingly for monetary 
ease (and sometimes for monetary restriction), while the U.S. government has more 
frequently pushed for monetary contraction in comparison to the other two cases. Again, this 
can be explained by the underlying developments in economic variables such as inflation or 
GDP growth: while in Germany the inflation was on average rather low, the government 
might have forced the Bundesbank to use monetary policy instruments to support other 
macroeconomic objectives (higher GDP growth). This was probably not the case in the U.S., 
where the fight against high inflation in the 1970s and early 1980s was officially supported 
from the government. Similarly to the German case, the one-way pressure from the Czech 
government may have been caused by the combination of declining inflation, weak growth 
and still high central bank’s interest rates (a detailed inspection is provided in the next 
section). Nevertheless, on average government rather push for monetary ease than the other 
way. 
Third, the ratio indicates that in contrast to the Czech and German government, the 
U.S. administration is far less homogenous. In this regards, we might be interested whether 
there was heterogeneity rather across members, across time, or both.  
Chart 1: The "net" political pressure on FED from government
("sum" of pressure signals; minus SAFER index, i.e. minus refers to demand for monetary ease)
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8 As the data are not available for individual members of the group “government”, we 
can only indirectly derive the degree of homogeneity from the time pattern of the pressure. 
Chart 1 shows the development of the net pressure on the Fed over time and indicates that 
signals of the same direction, be it for monetary ease or monetary tightness, have come in 
clusters in the American case. Thus, as it is rather improbable that always the same member 
of government signals within one time cluster, the U.S. government is probably homogenous 
across its members, but not necessarily across time, as it reacts with the pressure signals on 
economic developments in both directions. 
Chart 2 shows for comparison the time pattern of the pressure from government on the 
Bundesbank. In line with conclusions derived from Table 1, we can now see more plastically 
that the “density” and frequency of signaling is indeed much lower in the German case than in 
the U.S. case, and that the signaling is in most cases towards monetary ease. 
Chart 2: The "net" political pressure on Bundesbank from government
("sum" of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease)
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Finally, Chart 3 shows the development of the signaling from the Czech government 
on the CNB (in order to facilitate the comparison, the horizontal time axis is the same as in 
the two preceding cases).  
Chart 3: The "net" political pressure on CNB from government
("sum" of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease)
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Again, Chart 3 indicates that in spite of the short time span of available data, the 
relative frequency of signaling from the Czech government was relatively high. At the same 
9 time, however, the “peaks” in net pressure are lower than in the German and the U.S. case, 
indicating that the debate in newspapers on monetary issues might be frequent, but is probably 
less intensive in the Czech Republic. The reason might be that the Czech government 
considers a lower degree of signaling within a month as sufficient for effective pressure. 
Finally, Table 1 shows that government does not represent the most active player in 
signaling. In both the Czech and German case, the number of signals from government 
amounted to less than 25% of all pressure signals sent to the central bank. 
4.2 Total Political Pressure on CNB and its Decomposition 
Table 2 shows the total pressure on the Czech National Bank and its decomposition by 
interest groups, and compares it with the pressure on the Bundesbank. 
Table 2: Political pressure on central banks
CNB Bundesbank
period covered 1997:6-2005:3 1960:1-1998:12
(number of months) 94 468
# signals 180 527
(out of all pressure signals) 100.0% 100.0%
# signals per year 23.0 13.5
sum (net pressure; minus=ease) -166 -339
ratio (sum / # signals, in %) -92.2% -64.3%
# signals 41 85
(out of all pressure signals) 22.8% 16.1%
# signals per year 5.2 2.2
sum (net pressure; minus=ease) -41 -71
ratio (sum / # signals, in %) -100.0% -83.5%
# signals 40 140
(out of all pressure signals) 22.2% 26.6%
# signals per year 5.1 3.6
sum (net pressure; minus=ease) -28 -78
ratio (sum / # signals, in %) -70.0% -55.7%
# signals 36 55
(out of all pressure signals) 20.0% 10.4%
# signals per year 4.6 1.4
sum (net pressure; minus=ease) -36 -29
ratio (sum / # signals, in %) -100.0% -52.7%
# signals 6 69
(out of all pressure signals) 3.3% 13.1%
# signals per year 0.8 1.8
sum (net pressure; minus=ease) -6 -69
ratio (sum / # signals, in %) -100.0% -100.0%
# signals 57 178
(out of all pressure signals) 31.7% 33.8%
# signals per year 7.3 4.6
sum (net pressure; minus=ease) -55 -92
ratio (sum / # signals, in %) -96.5% -51.7%



























































The table reveals several interesting features about the pattern of the pressure. First, 
the frequency of total pressure signals was on average higher in the Czech case (23 signals per 
year) than in the German case (13 signals per year). This confirms also the combined Chart 4.  
10 Chart 4: The total "net" political pressure on Bundesbank and CNB
("sum" of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease)
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The “density” of pressure signals to CNB is comparable only to periods with frequent 
pressure signals in the German case, as for example with late 1960s or with early 1990s. 
Similarly, as in the case of pressure from government, the pressure peaks are lower on CNB 
than on Bundesbank, but since early 1980s, the peaks in pressure on both central banks are 
comparable. 
Second, in both countries, the total pressure was rather towards monetary ease than 
restriction, but as the ratio shows, the inclination to push for monetary ease was much more 
prevalent in the Czech case. Looking at Chart 4, this may be explained by a too short time 
span, which is additionally characterized by declining inflation, so that there was simply no 
occasion to force the central bank to fight with rising inflation. 
Third, the position of financial sector in both countries is comparable: the frequency of 
signaling was rather high, in both countries financial sector demanded on average rather 
monetary ease, slightly more in the Czech case than in the German case, given the higher ratio 
of pressure on CNB. Chart 5 also illustrates this. 
Chart 5: The "net" political pressure on Bundesbank and CNB from financial sector
("sum" of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease)
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Nevertheless, from a theoretical point of view, it is surprising that financial sector 
pushed on average more for monetary ease, as some authors (Posen 1993) argue that financial 
sector represents the natural opposition against inflation and against government’s attempts to 
11 force the central bank to loose monetary policy.11 For the Czech case, this may be mainly 
explained by two factors. First, bank analysts, actually next to academic members the only 
ones with professional knowledge of monetary issues, when regularly assessing the CNB 
policy, frequently added their own opinions about how the “optimal” disinflation strategy 
should look like. Usually, they were expressing the dislike about the too restrictive monetary 
policy. Second, bank officials often expressed concerns about the adverse impact of the too 
restrictive policy on the financial conditions of their debtors, and thus on their ability to repay 
existing debt. However, financial sector remains the sector with the highest number of signals 
towards monetary tightness, at least in the Czech Republic. 
Fourth, the frequency of signaling from employers is much higher in the Czech 
Republic (on average around five signals per year, as compared to between one and two in 
Germany). Moreover, they exclusively demanded monetary ease in the Czech Republic when 
compared to Germany. The reason for both higher frequency of signaling and the direction of 
pressure is probably the orientation of most Czech companies towards export, and related 
sensitivity to exchange rate movements. Representatives of export-oriented companies 
frequently asked the central bank to “do” something with too appreciated domestic currency, 
effectively asking the central bank for easing the monetary conditions (i.e. the combination of 
interest rates and exchange rate) they faced. This contrasts with the German case. Maier 
(2002) disaggregated the employers in Germany into two subgroups, the export-oriented 
producers, and the firms producing mainly for the domestic market, and showed that the 
export-oriented firms prevailingly asked for monetary ease, while the domestic-oriented firms 
for monetary contraction, fearing the consequences of higher inflation more than the export-
oriented ones.12
Chart 6: The "net" political pressure on Bundesbank and CNB from employers
("sum" of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease)























Fifth, trade unions in both countries always asked for monetary ease (Chart 7).  
                                                           
11 Alternative view, however, argues that ongoing monetary ease, i.e. decline in short-term 
interest rates, is at least from the short-term perspective profitable for the financial sector, as banks 
transform short-term deposits into long-term loans, and the portfolios that include bonds rise in value. 
12 Out of 55 signals from German employers, 32 (i.e. around 60%) were export-oriented firms. 
The domestic-oriented producers were additionally the only group with small but positive ratio 
(4.3%), demanding on average rather monetary tightness than ease (see Maier 2002, p. 84). 
12 Chart 7: The "net" political pressure on Bundesbank and CNB from trade unions
("sum" of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease)
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Nevertheless, the frequency of signals is quite low in the Czech case (just about one 
signal per year, compared to around 2 per year in Germany), and also the share of signals 
from trade unions in the total number of signals is much lower in the Czech case, pointing to 
low activity of labor union members in signaling. The main reason might be the political 
constellation in the Czech Republic where between 1998 and 2005 the government was 
formed by social democrats (in 1998-2002 alone, 2002-2005 in a coalition), a natural ally of 
labor unions. Thus, the union members probably did not have to express their preferences for 
a change in monetary policy so frequently, as they were in line with the government’s 
pressure direction and probably considered it as sufficient. 
Finally, other groups, including journalists, members of academia, politicians from 
non-government parties, international institution representatives, and the general public, were 
very active in the Czech case. The high share of signals in total signals (more than 30%) and 
high frequency of signaling (about seven signals per year) make this “residual” group the 
most active group of all. The reason may be the heterogeneous composition of the group, and 
the much easier access of journalists to newspapers (the journalists of Hospodarske noviny 
have naturally their regular article where they frequently commented, assessed and hereby 
also put pressure on the central bank). Interestingly, the direction of pressure was much more 
homogeneous in the Czech case (ratio of -96.5%), indicating that even the general perception 
of the then monetary policy was probably similar across the whole spectrum of pressure 
groups. 
13 Chart 8: The "net" political pressure on Bundesbank and CNB from other sources
("sum" of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease)
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4.3 The Role of Support for Monetary Policy 
Following Maier (2002), an indicator for measuring political support for the Czech 
National Bank was constructed. As he argues, political support may contribute to the factual 
independence of central banks: if the central bank faces political pressure for a change of 
monetary policy, but at the same time enjoys support for its current monetary policy, the 
pressure may be partly eliminated and the central bank may continue in pursuing its 
“optimal”, on economic fundamentals based policy.  
The support indicator was constructed similarly to the pressure indicator, by counting 
articles expressing support for current monetary policy, regardless of the actual monetary 
policy stance. Those articles were counted as +1. The same pressure groups were identified. 
Table 3 shows the results in comparison with the support for the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. If not differentiating between pressure groups, the frequency of support signals 
is slightly higher in the Czech case (around 11 support signals per year, as compared to 8 
signals for Bundesbank). This may be explained by higher frequency of expressing support 
from the financial sector and from others, including the general public. Thus, the CNB 
enjoyed relatively high public support, even slightly higher than in Germany where this factor 
is usually counted as one of the main factors contributing to successful monetary policy. On 
the other hand, the CNB enjoyed quite low and infrequent support from government when 
compared to the Bundesbank, relatively low support from employers, and even no support 
from trade unions.  
The ratio of number of support signals to the number of pressure signals shows the 
degree of homogeneity within groups. The ratio is comparable between both countries when 
computed from the total figures (between 50% and 60%), but it reveals several interesting 
features for the individual pressure groups. First, we would expect that if members of a 
pressure groups share common interests, they would probably signal towards the central bank 
in a homogenous way. This appears not to be confirmed by the data, as for most pressure 
groups the ratio is relatively high. The ratio around 100% indicates that there is an intensive 
debate within the group, as approximately the same number of signals is sent demanding 
change in monetary policy as the number supporting the current monetary policy. The ratio 
much higher would indicate that the group is rather supporting the central bank, while a very 
low ratio indicates that the group is rather putting pressure on a change in monetary policy. 
14 Table 3: Political support for central banks
CNB Bundesbank
period covered 1997:6-2005:3 1960:1-1998:12
(number of months) 94 468
# support signals 90 311
(out of all support signals) 100.0% 100.0%
# support signals per year 11.5 8.0
ratio # support / # pressure 50.0% 59.0%
# support signals 8 90
(out of all support signals) 8.9% 28.9%
# support signals per year 1.0 2.3
ratio # support / # pressure 19.5% 105.9%
# support signals 36 111
(out of all support signals) 40.0% 35.7%
# support signals per year 4.6 2.8
ratio # support / # pressure 90.0% 79.3%
# support signals 4 59
(out of all support signals) 4.4% 19.0%
# support signals per year 0.5 1.5
ratio # support / # pressure 11.1% 107.3%
# support signals 0 6
(out of all support signals) 0.0% 1.9%
# support signals per year 0.0 0.2
ratio # support / # pressure 0.0% 8.7%
# support signals 42 45
(out of all support signals) 46.7% 14.5%
# support signals per year 5.4 1.2
ratio # support / # pressure 73.7% 25.3%
























































Table 3 indicates that the ratio of support to pressure is higher than 100% in the case 
of German government, so that German government supported the Bundesbank rather than 
demanded change in the policy. This is a bit surprising, as it does not correspond to the 
traditional models of conflict between government and the central bank, as described in the 
theoretical literature. However, the low support of the CNB from the Czech government, 
indicated by the low ratio, again supports the theoretical literature. The highest support 
relative to pressure received the CNB from the financial sector (ratio of 90%) and from other, 
unspecified groups (74%).  
For further illustration, Chart 9 shows the time pattern of the support for both the 
Bundesbank and the CNB. The chart confirms the conclusions of Table 3, especially those of 
the relatively high density of support signals. In addition, Chart 9 also indicates that the peaks 
in support were in general higher in the case of Bundesbank, which may stem from the higher 
number of newspapers from which the signals were counted in the German case. All in all, 
however, the support for the Czech National Bank seems to be quite significant and at least 
comparable to the support for the Bundesbank. 
15 Chart 9: The total political support for Bundesbank and CNB
(number of support signals)
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A detailed inspection of Chart 9 and its comparison with Chart 4 suggests that there 
might be a relationship between pressure and support, as the periods with high pressure 
appear to correspond with periods with high support. More in general, discussions of 
monetary policy issues in the newspapers seem to come in clusters, probably starting with an 
introductory contribution that triggers further articles, both pressure and supportive ones.  
In order to test the above hypothesis formally in the case of the CNB, we first 
construct a variable abs_pressure that equals the absolute value of the total net pressure. The 
correlation of monthly values between abs_pressure and support_total is quite high (0.55). 
Subsequently, we apply the Granger causality test to the monthly series of both variables.13  
Table 4: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1997:06 2005:03; monthly data; Lags: 4.
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat. Prob.
  SUPPORT_TOTAL does not Granger Cause ABS_PRESSURE 90 0.82 0.52
  ABS_PRESSURE does not Granger Cause SUPPORT_TOTAL 3.60 0.01  
Table 4 shows that the correlation runs from pressure to support, i.e. articles 
demanding change in monetary policy triggered public support for existing monetary policy, a 
result that is in line with the findings on the Bundesbank (Maier 2002, p. 105).14
5. Explaining the Political Pressure on the Czech National Bank 
We have already mentioned several times the reasons for a specific pattern or direction 
of pressure on monetary policy from different interest groups. As was shown in the preceding 
section, support always emerged after pressure signals had emerged. But what caused the 
pressure to arise?  
As we have seen, the pressure from all pressure groups on the CNB was rather towards 
monetary ease. Thus, the pressure groups regarded on average the monetary policy stance as 
too restrictive and harmful for their interests. In this section we explain – first in a rather 
                                                           
13 We also tried to perform the analysis using the daily data. The problem is, however, that daily 
data contain too many zeros, as on many days there was no pressure or support. This causes the 
Granger causality to run both ways if applied at the daily frequency of data.  
14 Applying different lags does not change the result of the one-way direction of influence. 
16 anecdotic way, then also formally – when and why the monetary policy stance was considered 
as too restrictive by individual interest groups and how it triggered the pressure. 
Chart 10 shows the time pattern of the total net pressure on the CNB and the two 
elections into the Chamber of Deputies if the Czech parliament that took place in 1998 and 
2002. Three periods can be identified in which the pressure was significant: mid-1997, then 
the whole year 1998 (and partly also the year 1999), and finally the period between mid-2001 
and mid-2002. In order to explain the pressure in these three periods, we have to mention 
three structural factors that may have contributed to the monetary policy that have been 
labeled as “too restrictive” by many pressure groups. Note also that the peaks in the pressure 
occurred in months immediately preceding the elections, indicating that the timing of pressure 
was not independent from the political cycle. 
Chart 10: The total "net" political pressure on the Czech National Bank
(pressure as measured by the "sum" of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease








































Elections into Chamber 
of Deputies
(June 2002)




First, the move from the exchange rate peg to floating in May 1997 was actually 
forced by a small exchange rate crisis. In early 1997, markets started to doubt about the 
sustainability of the peg and speculated against the CZK, expecting an official devaluation, 
given several macroeconomic problems including rising inflation and high current account 
deficit of the Czech economy. Next to the move to floating, the CNB fought against the 
speculation by raising official interest rates to very high levels, triggering the pressure from 
producers, as their financing costs (interest rates applied to loans) increased substantially. The 
burden that domestic producers had to bear triggered also the pressure from government, as it 
feared the adverse effect of such a monetary restriction on the economy. 
17 Chart 11: Development of the 2W repo rate of the CNB












































As Chart 11 shows, the CNB eventually started in the second half of 1997 and during 
1998 to decrease the interest rates again, as the exchange rate stabilized (at a slightly 
depreciated level). Nevertheless, the speed with which the CNB has been decreasing the 
interest rates was a subject of conflict between the CNB and government: the CNB feared the 
negative effects of depreciated exchange rate on inflation and additionally it was not sure 
whether the market confidence in the reached level of exchange rate had been re-established. 
Thus, it decreased the interest rates rather slowly and in many small steps, effectively 
smoothing the movements in money market interest rates. On the other hand, government 
regarded the speed as too low, and pointed out that the high level of interest rates had 
devastating effects on the GDP growth, being ready to tolerate a slightly higher rate of 
inflation. Thus, the conflict was a typical representation of a conflict about the optimal point 
on the short-term Phillips curve. 
Together with employers and government, financial sector expressed its concerns 
about the impact of the restriction on the health of the corporate sector, the main source of 
earnings for banks given the low indebtedness of households. Labor unions, in line with other 
groups, pushed for monetary ease, fearing the increase in unemployment given the effect of 
monetary restriction on the real economy. As Chart 12 shows, the GDP growth indeed 
declined, became negative in 1998 and early 1999, while the inflation indeed increase at the 
end of 1998 and in early 1999. 
Second, with loosing the fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor of monetary policy, 
the CNB was in search of a new monetary regime, that was found in the inflation targeting. 
However, given the relatively high inflation in the period of introduction of the inflation 
targeting in the Czech Republic (end-1997 and early 1998), the CNB used the inflation 
targeting as a disinflation strategy. The aim was to bring inflation levels closer to the 
European levels of inflation, contributing to the nominal convergence, one of the prerequisites 
for the future adoption of the euro after the EU accession. Again, the speed of disinflation 
became a conflict issue between the government and the CNB, given the negative GDP 
growth between end.1997 and early 1999 and very low inflation in 1999, leading even to 
discussions about limiting the central bank independence in 1999 and 2000.  
 
18 Chart 12: Development of the GDP growth and inflation
(in %; GDP growth y-o-y, quarterly data; CPI y-o-y, monthly data)
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Third, and finally, the very open Czech economy is sensitive to exchange rate 
movements. The development in exchange rate became an issue in 2001-2002, as the strong 
appreciation caused predominantly by expected privatization revenues in euros and the need 
of government to change the euros in the FX market to CZK started to decrease the price 
competitiveness of the Czech export-oriented companies. This triggered the pressure from the 
employers “to do something with the exchange rate”, either by FX interventions or by cutting 
the official interest rates. This has of course indirectly triggered also the government reaction, 
as the government feared the adverse effects of problems in export-oriented industry on 
unemployment and the political popularity and support. Chart 13 shows the development in 
the exchange rate against the euro, the currency of the main trading partners of the Czech 
producers, illustrating the extent of the appreciation in 2001-2002. 
Chart 13: Development of the CZK/EUR exchange rate







































For a more formal analysis of the pressure on the CNB, we estimate a “pressure” 
reaction function of the pressure groups as a whole (total), linking the emergence and 
intensity of political pressure to developments in economic variables, as we have seen that the 
19 developments in the exchange rate, inflation and GDP were probably the main triggers of 
pressure.15  
The following reaction function was estimated: 
t t t t t cpi a czkeur er a czkeur er a gap gdp a c total pressure Δ + Δ + Δ + + = − − − 4 1 3 2 1 1 _ _ _ _
  1) 
The main hypothesis behind the equation (1) is that the pressure for monetary ease 
emerges if the GDP gap is negative (a1 positive), if the exchange rate appreciates (a2 and a3 
positive) and also if the inflation has a declining trend (a4 positive).16 Table 5 shows the 
results.  
Table 5: Regression results
Dependent Variable: PRESSURE_TOTAL
Sample(adjusted): 1997:08 2005:03; monthly data Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 92 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.77 0.19 -3.97 0.00
GDP_GAP(-1) 0.58 0.08 7.25 0.00
D_ER_CZKEUR 2.15 0.37 5.78 0.00
D_ER_CZKEUR(-1) 0.69 0.35 1.95 0.05
D_CPI(-1) 0.60 0.24 2.44 0.02
Adjusted R-squared 0.49 Durbin-Watson stat 1.44  
All coefficients were positive and significant, as we have assumed. Thus, we can 
conclude that pressure groups are sensitive to developments in macroeconomic variables and 
that they generate pressure if they feel to be severely hit by macroeconomic developments 
that have effect on their income or survival prospects, both on economic and political 
markets.17
6. Estimating the effect of political pressure on monetary policy 
The preceding sections introduced an indicator for political pressure on the CNB and 
discussed the pattern of pressure across pressure groups and time. However, we are mainly 
interested in whether political pressure had a significant impact on the CNB’s monetary 
policy. We attempt to answer this question in two dimensions: first, we ask whether political 
pressure had impact on the direction of the monetary policy (restrictiveness versus ease), 
second, we ask whether pressure had impact on the uncertainty central bank faces when 
deciding on interest rate changes.  
                                                           
15 Of course, individual pressure groups probably react differently or at least with different 
sensitivity to changes in macroeconomic variables. 
16 All the variables were checked to be stationary. The lag structure of the individual economic 
variables was set according to the significance and Akaike information criterion. For the GDP gap we 
use a proxy variablem namely the “GDP growth gap” that is set to the difference between interpolated 
monthly values of the original quarterly GDP growth series and the growth of the potential output that 
was set to 3% (i.e. it is not the traditional GDP gap computed from levels, as this would require some 
estimation of initial GDP gap). The estimations were done in EViews 4.1. 
17 In the period 1997-2005, the CNB operated under two governors: Mr. Tosovsky (till end-
2000) and Mr. Tuma (after end-2000). The Chow test indicates that there was no structural break in 
the pattern of pressure from interest groups between these two sub-periods. 
20 First, we conduct a simple Granger causality test in order to see whether pressure 
Granger caused changes in monetary policy. Table 6 shows that total net pressure had 
significant impact on changes in the official interest rate of the CNB, the 2W repo rate.  
Table 6: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1997:06 2005:03; monthly data; Lags: 4.
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  PRESSURE_TOTAL does not Granger Cause D_CNB_REPO_EOP 89 3.93454 0.00575
  D_CNB_REPO_EOP does not Granger Cause PRESSURE_TOTAL 0.52157 0.72012  
We also estimated an equation relating the change in CNB repo rate to the pressure 
(see Equation 2): 
t t t t total pressure a eop repo cnb a eop repo cnb ε + + Δ = Δ − _ _ _ _ _ 2 1 1   2) 
The main hypothesis behind including the lagged change in the repo rate is that it 
stands for the smoothing strategy of the CNB, so that if the central bank decides to change 
interest rates, it makes it in small steps over several months in order to prevent abrupt changes 
in the money market rates. Similarly to the Granger causality test, the regression results 
shown in Table 7 indicate that the CNB reacted on political pressure.18  
Table 7: Regression results
Dependent Variable: D_CNB_REPO_EOP
Sample(adjusted): 1997:08 2005:03; monthly data Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 92 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D_CNB_REPO_EOP(-1) 0.32 0.06 5.19 0.00
PRESSURE_TOTAL 0.05 0.01 4.45 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 0.32     Durbin-Watson stat 1.53  
Nevertheless, to conclude that the CNB succumbed to the political pressure and 
accommodated the wishes of the pressure groups would disregard the possibility that the CNB 
conducted an independent monetary policy based on economic fundamentals that, by accident 
or deliberately, was in line with the pressure. In other words, the estimation results in Table 7 
could be spurious due to the existence of third factors that have impact on both pressure and 
official interest rates. Thus, we estimate a full-fledged reaction function of the CNB, 
including both economic variables and the pressure variable.  
Within the inflation-targeting framework, a central bank adjusts official interest rates 
according to the forecasts of inflation and output gap, respectively. In an open economy, 
exchange rate plays additional key role. We also add the lagged change in the interest rates in 
order to take into account the “smoothing” strategy. We assume that the current values of 
inflation and output gap are strongly correlated with the expected values, given the frictions in 
the economy, so that we use the current values.19 As exchange rate is difficult to forecast, we 
use the current value. Thus, we estimate a reaction function in the following form:20
                                                           
18 Monthly data were used. The analysis was also done using 3M money market rates, but the 
results hardly change. 
19 Again, for GDP gap we use the GDP growth gap proxy. Alternatively, current values may be 
used as proxies for forecasted values, as the current values of GDP and also inflation are usually not 
know in the current month of the decision about interest rates. 
20 We use 3M money market rates, as these better reflect also the near-term development in the 
official interest rates, in order to compensate for the bias given the use of current variables. 
21  
t t t t eop czkeur er a gap gdp a cpi a eop m pribor a eop m pribor Δ + + Δ + Δ = Δ − _ _ _ _ 3 _ _ 3 _ 4 3 2 1 1
  3) 
Table 8 shows the regression results; all the coefficients are significant, the GDP gap 
on the 10% level of significance, the other variables on the 5% level.  
Table 8: Regression results
Dependent Variable: D_PRIBOR_3M_EOP
Sample(adjusted): 1997:08 2005:03; monthly data Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 92 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D_PRIBOR_3M_EOP(-1) 0.20 0.07 2.69 0.01
D_CPI 0.18 0.07 2.49 0.01
GDP_GAP 0.04 0.02 1.84 0.07
D_ER_CZKEUR_EOP 0.19 0.07 2.56 0.01
Adjusted R-squared 0.17     Durbin-Watson stat 2.01  
Adding the pressure variable makes the gdp_gap variable and the er_czkeur_eop 
variable insignificant, and the pressure becomes significant (see Table 9). This may be caused 
by the co-linearity between these two economic variables and the pressure variable, as 
discussed in the preceding section. As a result, we cannot conclude that the pressure is a 
significant variable in explaining the change in interest rates.  
Table 9: Regression results
Dependent Variable: D_PRIBOR_3M_EOP Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1997:08 2005:03; monthly data
Included observations: 92 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D_PRIBOR_3M_EOP(-1) 0.17 0.07 2.34 0.02
D_CPI 0.14 0.07 1.87 0.06
GDP_GAP 0.01 0.03 0.33 0.74
D_ER_CZKEUR_EOP 0.12 0.08 1.52 0.13
PRESSURE_TOTAL 0.05 0.02 2.02 0.05
Adjusted R-squared 0.20     Durbin-Watson stat 2.03  
Thus, at the final stage, we apply a slightly modified approach: in order to get rid of 
the co-linearity, we decompose the pressure variable into a part that is explained by economic 
fundamentals and a part that remains unexplained, and use only the unexplained part of the 
pressure (“adjusted pressure”). For such decomposition, we can make use of the regression 
results in Table 5 and use residuals from the estimation of equation (1). Table 10 shows the 
results.  
Table 10: Regression results
Dependent Variable: D_PRIBOR_3M_EOP Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1997:08 2005:03; monthly data
Included observations: 92 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
D_PRIBOR_3M_EOP(-1) 0.19 0.07 2.61 0.01
D_CPI 0.16 0.07 2.15 0.03
GDP_GAP 0.04 0.02 1.98 0.05
D_ER_CZKEUR_EOP 0.17 0.07 2.26 0.03
ADJUST_PRESSURE 0.05 0.03 1.55 0.13
Adjusted R-squared 0.18     Durbin-Watson stat 2.07  
22 The adjusted pressure variable appears insignificant, while the fundamentals remain 
significant in explaining the changes in interest rates. Thus, as a result, the pressure is 
correlated with the changes in official interest rates, but after controlling for economic 
variables on basis of which the central bank usually decides about interest rates, the pressure 
becomes insignificant. This indicates that the Czech National Bank, as regards the impact of 
pressure groups on the direction of monetary policy, did not blindly accommodate preferences 
of the pressure groups, but preserved its factual independence and continued to conduct 
monetary policy based on economic fundamentals.21
However, as to the second issue we are interested in, namely that of the impact of 
political pressure on uncertainty that is obviously inherent in policymaking, we have to check 
whether there was a significant link between pressure and a proxy that would stand for 
uncertainty. The logic of the channel is following: if political pressure is not strong enough to 
induce a change in monetary policy stance, it may be sufficient to make policymakers 
uncertain as to whether selected change in monetary policy based on economic fundamentals 
is appropriate. Clearly, decision making in monetary policy is always marked by inherent 
uncertainty, as most of the actions taken by the central bank rely on forecasts and estimates of 
relevant fundamental variables. Pressure groups may take advantage of it and attempt to make 
the policymakers more uncertain, thus preventing the change to occur (or lowering the 
probability that it will occur), if they cannot reverse the direction.  
We measure the uncertainty with which Czech National Bank decided about changes 
in official interest rates via the degree of consensus among Bank Board members when taking 
decisions about changes in monetary policy. Since beginning of 1998, the Czech National 
Bank, when publishing the minutes from the Bank Boar meeting where changes in official 
interest rates were decided upon, reveals also how many members voted for or against the 
proposal that was eventually accepted (the individual names are not mentioned). Thus, we 
define a proxy for uncertainty as a binary variable that takes zero if the decision was 
unanimous (i.e. certain decision) and one if the decision was taken only with majority (i.e. 
uncertain decision), and we call it “uncertainty-in-decision index”. The logic is that if there is 
uncertainty as to the appropriate monetary policy change, the probability that individual Bank 
Board members will have different opinions about appropriate reaction rises. 
We construct a series of the index on a monthly basis. The decisions in the sample 
include all possible decisions, i.e. increasing rates, decreasing them, or not changing them. In 
those months in which there were more Bank Board meetings with monetary policy decisions 
we apply a pro-uncertainty approach: if at least in one of the meetings the decision was not 
taken unanimously, we assign the value of one (i.e. uncertain decision). Chart 14 shows the 
index in comparison with the total political pressure on the CNB. 
                                                           
21 Again, we conducted the Chow test to see whether the reaction of interest rates differed 
between the sub-periods till end-2000 (Tosovsky’s period) and after end-2000 (Tuma’s period). The 
test did not indicate a structural break. 
23 Chart 14: The "uncertainty-in-decision index" versus total political pressure on CNB
(pressure as measured by the "sum" of pressure signals, minus refers to demand for monetary ease; 
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Chart 14 does not reveal any simple pattern in the relationship between uncertainty 
index and political pressure. From the visual inspection we could conclude that in several 
periods the pressure might have induced some uncertainty (the “critical” years 1998 and 
2002), but in other periods the pressure does not seem to have been linked with uncertainty in 
decision making (the year 2003).  
In order to test formally whether pressure had significant impact on uncertainty we 
apply a probit model, asking whether the existence of pressure (as measured by the absolute 
value of pressure abs_pressure) can explain the probability that the decision (as measured by 
the decision_index) will be uncertain (i.e. not unanimous). Table 11 presents the results. 
Table 11: Regression results
Dependent Variable: DECISION_INDEX Method: ML - Binary Probit
Sample: 1998:01 2005:03; monthly data
Included observations: 87
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
ABS_PRESSURE 0.02 0.05 0.42 0.68  
Table 11 indicates that no systematic impact of political pressure on the probability 
that the decision about monetary policy will not be unanimous can be detected. Thus, we may 
conclude that the Czech National Bank, next to being resilient to pressure signals asking for 
monetary easy, also proved to cope with uncertainty inherent in monetary policy without a 
systematic influence from pressure groups. 
7. Conclusions 
Independent central banks usually face political pressure from different pressure 
groups, starting with government and going through financial sector, employers, labor unions 
up to the general public as a whole. In this paper, we have attempted to measure and explain 
the political pressure on the Czech National Bank, the central bank of the Czech Republic, 
using the methodology introduced by Havrilesky (1993) for measuring the pressure on the 
U.S. Federal Reserve and further extended by Maier (2002) when applied to the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. The direction, intensity and the time pattern of the pressure was discussed, 
compared with the pattern of pressure on both Fed and Bundesbank, and explained. 
Additionally, the role of public support for the monetary policy was discussed, and the effect 
of political pressure on monetary policy of the CNB estimated. 
24 The main conclusion is that the Czech National Bank faced considerable political 
pressure towards monetary ease in the period 1997-2005, comparable to the pressure on the 
Fed and even slightly higher than the pressure on the Bundesbank, but did not succumb to the 
pressure, sticking to monetary policy based on economic fundamentals. Political pressure did 
not have any systematic impact on both the direction of the monetary policy and the 
uncertainty under which policymakers decided. Thus, the formal (or de iure) independence of 
the CNB proved to be factual (or de facto) as well. 
However, further analysis of the relationship between political pressure and monetary 
policy is needed. First, it is necessary to provide several robustness checks of the specification 
of the model of reaction function, employing a bit more fine methods of econometric analysis 
such as the event study. Second, should the relationship prove to be significant (or should we 
arrive at the conclusion that it is not possible to reject the hypothesis of no relationship), it 
would be necessary to discuss in detail the channels through which the pressure might work.  
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